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Korea in the New World Order* 
I 
Introciucrion 
On May 3, 1965, T h:ld the privilege of talking at Seoul National University. My 
assigned subject was, in substance: Where did the Republic of Korea stand in terms of the 
stages of economic growth? I argued that Korea was at the beginning of take-off. It is a 
rough measure of the extraordinary achievement of the men and women of this country 
that, a quaner century later, I have been asked to talk in Seoul on "Korea in The New 
World Order." This time I shall argue that a Korea that has sustained since 1965 an 
average annual growth rate of about 7% per capita; that is on the eve of the age of high 
mass consumption, while rapidly approaching the technological frontier; and which is 
actively engaged in increased democratization of irs political life -- such a Korea, has a role 
of consequence and responsibility to play if, in the generations ahead, the global 
community is to bring to life a New World Order. 
My argument proceeds in four steps. 
First, I shall try to identify the powerful underlying forces which brought the 
concept of a New World Order to the surface in the second half of the 1980s, well before 
the Gulf War. This concept played some part, for example, in the remarkable symposium 
organized by the Seoul Olympic Spons Promotion Foundation in September 1989. 
Second. I shall explore bow the Gulf War both heightened our awareness of the 
need for a New World Order and sharpened our understanding of the extremely difficult 
problems that must be solved if the concept is to be given substance. 
My third point is the peculiarly important role of regional as well as ·global 
instimtions in building a New World Order. 
*In addition to the imponant contribution to this paper by Thomas Seung, 
noted in the text, I wish to thank Harry Middleton for helpful suggestions, and 
Elspeth Davies Rostow for rigorous editing for both detail and substance .. 
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And, finally, I shall suggest a potential role of Korea in such a grand enterprise. 
II 
Underlying Forces. 
It was the apparently sudden end to the Cold War that posed the questions: What 
next? Within what broad framework should we view the world and set our objectives? 
The notion of a New World Order arose from effons to answer those questions. The key 
to an answer lies in a curious fact: the forces which led the Soviet leadership to bring the 
Cold War to an end and to contemplate radical changes in the Soviet system, are precisely 
the forces which the world community must confront and organize peacefully if a New 
World Order is to be achieved. 
First -- and above all -- was the progressive diffusion of power and technological 
capacity away from both Moscow and Washington. This was, of course, not a new 
phenomenon. I would date it from 1948 when Tito successfully broke with Stalin and 
when the American Congress voted the Marshall plan legislation guaranteeing that in time a 
vital Wes tern Europe would re-emerge. 
It was also in the late 1940s that Moscow's attention shifted to the expansion of 
Soviet power and influence in the developing world. In sustained pursuit of that goal, 
Moscow enjoyed some tactical gains; but disappointments mounted with the split with 
China and frustration with increasingly assertive nationalism in Latin America, Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia. This long campaign was climaxed by the debacle in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s. Meanwhile, it became apparent that Eastern Europe would become increasingly 
difficult and expensive for Moscow to control And so Gorbachev cut the imperial knot, as 
British Prime Minister Cement Atlee had done forty years earlier by granting Indian 
independence . 
The diffusion of technological capacity also had the effect of spreading the capacity 
to manufacture nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction into the 
/ 
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developing regions, turning them into sources of anxiety for Moscow rather than areas of 
opportunity. 
Soviet anxiety was funher heightened by the character of the great technological 
revolution which came on stage in the mid- l 970s: micro-electronics, generic engineering, 
lasers, and a batch of new industrial materials. The pace and diversified character of that 
revolution proved impossible for a centralized command economy to manage; and so the 
Soviet Union found itself falling behind Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and, 
even, behind such a precocious developing country as The Republic of Korea. Among the 
consequences of the new technologies was a globalization of communications and of the 
world economy itself, which dramatized to much of the Soviet leadership that, unless 
revolutionary changes were brought about, the U.S.S.R. would become a self-isolated, 
technological backwater, caught in a time warp. 
It was precisely this diffusion of power, combined with a new technological 
revolution, which posed the central challenge for a New World Order: Would the forces of 
diffusion which rendered the Cold War obsolete lead to chaos? Or could this arena of 
multiple centers of competence and initiative, caught up in accelerating global interactions, 
organize itself in stable peace? 
That is what the New World Order is about. But, as a goal and a dream, the New 
World Order is not new. It was memorably defined forty- six years ago. Listen, for a 
moment, to the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, a piece of prose worth 
recalling from time to time. 
"We the peoples of the United Nations determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of warwhich twice in our lifetime 
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 




to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. 
and for these ends 
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, 
and 
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and 
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used. save in the common interest, and 
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples, 
have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims." 
As definitions go, I doubt we can do much better than that 
But there is a deeply-rooted problem built into the Chaner. The preamble is 
proclaimed by the "peoples of the United Nations;" but the document was signed by 
representatives of governments which carefully preserved their sovereignty. Thus, the 
United Nations was not designed as a world government but, in its own phrasing, as " ... a 
center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common ends." 
III 
Two Lessons of the Gulf War. 
Against this general background I would underline two of the many possible lessons 
to be drawn from the Gulf war. First, the war dramatized both the potentiality and the 
limitations of the United Nations as the foundation for a New World Order. Second, as the 
post-war agenda in the Middle East emerges, the critical role of regionalism in a New 
World Order becomes increasingly clear. 
The Gulf War will surely be remembered as the first occasion when all the five 
permanent members of the Security Council did the following three things: one, took a 
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clear, firm stance against an act of aggression; two, explicitly sanctioned the use of force to 
undo that aggression; and three, negotiated agreed terms for a cease-fire in the wake of 
military success. In this city I need not recall that forty years ago the Security Council, in 
the absence of the Soviet Union, also sanctioned the use of force to undo an act of 
aggression. On both these occasions the existence of the United Nations as a meaningful 
organization was at stake. If it had not acted in 1950 and 1990 it would have gone the way 
of the League of Nations when that body failed to act in response to the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria in 1931. In June 1950, of course, the Soviet Union did not 
participate in the United Nations decision. Nevertheless, the United Nations has twice 
proved that it is capable of "uniting in; !':trength" to resist aggression. But, as the tragedy of 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq and of the Shi Iles in the South a.nest, the Charter can reaffirm its 
"faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person;" but it 
provides no effective machinery to enforce such rights when violated within the boundaries 
of a sovereign government. Very strong forces would now oppose any effort to grant such 
' 
enforcement power to the United Nations. The Economist put it bluntly in its issue of 
April 16th: 
Both the Americans and, much more painfully, the Kurds have run up 
against the same truth: it is that in the late 20th cenrury the rules of the international 
game set great store by sovereignty. Superpowers or coalitions may intervene 
against a tyrant to stop him spreading his nastiness abroad, but not to stop him 
inflicting nastiness upon his own people. So runs the uneasy present convention. 
It was upon this understanding that the allies supported the operation against Iraq. 
The first painful lesson dramatized by the Gulf war is that the cause of human rights 
within a sovereign nation can not be enforced by the United Nations. That cause must be 
advanced by other means -- a proposition to which I shall return. 
A second lesson of the Gulf War is that while aggression can be resisted and undone 
by effective military action in a fairly short time, the creation and maintenance of "peace and 
security" is a long slow job in which political, economic, and military measures must 
combine. 
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In the case of the Middle East there is a rough consensus that regional peace and 
security require three conditions: 
-- A settlement of the Palestine, Lebanon, and other major unresolved political 
questions within the area. 
-- A reliable arms limitation and control agreement that would rule out the temptation 
for any Middle East nation to seek regional hegemony by military means. 
-- A regional develop•• •1· 111 bank to accelerate the economic and social progress of the 
less affluent, financed, in part, at least, by oil revenues provided by the nations richly 
endowed with oil reserves. 
Although these three requirements are an interrelated package, there is a sequence 
built into them: arms control agreements require prior political settlements; an appropriate 
mobilization of regional and external resources for economic and social development 
requires a radical reduction of military expenditures which, on latest estimates, absorb 9% 
of the region's gross product. 
Obviously, none of this is possible unless the government$ and peoples of the 
Middle East - looking back over more than fony years of bloody struggle; looking at the 
tragedy all around them, loo.king at their children and heeding their fate -- decide that 
enough is enough; that it is time to make peace. Surely, the self-inflicted tragedies of the 
region since the end of the Second World War justify that decision. Those outside the 
region can try to help. But only the men and womL"n who live in the Middle East can 
decide. But if these history-haunted human beings decide for peace and security, all three 
components of a settlement are quite possible . 
. N 
The European Exanmle 
We know that some such outcome is possible because Europe, for many centuries an 
arena of carnage, has managed to create over the past forty-six years a reasonable if still 
somewhat fragile approximation of the international "peace and security" for which the 
/ 
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United Nations Chaner calls. It did so by acting effectively, in collaboration with the 
United States and, in recent years, with the Soviet Union, in all three of the dimensions 
cited earlier as necessary for a Middle East settlement: 
-- solutions _to critical political questions; notably Germany and Eastern Europe; 
-- arms control measures ruling out the possibilicy of military hegemony; and 
-- assistance from the more advantaged to the less advantaged nations of the region: 
notably, to countries in Southern and Eastern Europe. 
The key to this historically remarkable outcome lay in two characteristics of the 
process: first, the development of a relatively high degree of unity in post-war Western 
Europe; and the recognition by Western, and, later, Eastern Europe that both the United 
States and the Soviet Union had legitimate, abiding interests in the outcome. 
Why was Western European unity so important? There were, of course, significant 
economic advantages that came to Western Europe from post-war cooperation and then the 
Common Market; and there are further economic advantages to come if the goals of 1992 
are achieved and if, over the next generation, the economies of Western Europe and a 
revived Eastern Europe are woven together But the imponance of this process and, 
indeed, its initial motivation was much deeper. The immediate post-war architects of 
Western European unity were trying to answer three profound politico-military questions: 
How to create a safe, equitable, and civilized long run relationship between Germany and 
the rest of Europe; how to balance and deter the potential hegemonic power of the USSR; 
how to create the basis for dignified parmership with, rather than disproportionate 
dependence on, the United Stares. 
Despite some dangerous European crises over the past two generations these 
questions have been answered reasonably well as of the present; although the balance 




In terms of a New World Order, the point to be underlined is that, in a world of 
national sovereignties, regional cooperation can provide the only route to peace and security 
we know -- shon of a single government; namely, a stable balance of power. I would add 
that, it took a remarkable balance of power deal between the big and small states to 
manufacture the federal union of the United States in 1787; that is, the compromise that 
resulted in two senators from each state, irrespective of size. 
The curious character of the American Senate illustrates the final point I would make 
about regional organizations in general: they are the natural protectors of small and medium 
versus large, potentially hegemonic states. It was natural, for example, that, in post-war 
Europe, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Italy were the most reliable friends of 
European unity, except, of course, for the time when Jean Monnet quietly guided French 
policy. 
v 
Some Reflections on Regionalism Elsewhere 
I have argued thus far an essentially simple pair of propositions; 
-- The United Nations has now twice proved it can mobilize the will and force to 
undo an act of overt aggression albeit at severe human and material cost; 
-- but "to maintain international peace and security" and avoid military conflict the 
Security Council must be supplemented by regional organizations and agreements that, in 
effect, render acts of aggression grossly irrational by creating and sustaining regional 
balances ofpower. In that connection I cited the progress of Europe in the second half of 
the twentieth century and the agenda that confronts us in the Middle East. 
While each region, like each nation, is unique, the case for regionalism may be 
generalized. 




One rarely sees public reference to the Organization of American States (the OAS). 
In pan that is because it is not doing all that it might be doing -- or, at least, all that I would 
like to see it do, notably on the side of economic and social policy. But in pan the OAS is 
somewhat somnolent because it fulfills fairly well -- not perfectly, but fairly well -- its three 
security functions. 
The first is a function which quietly commands vinually universal agreement in the 
Western Hemisphere; namely, that no extra-continental power should emplace itself 
militarily in the region. Perhaps K.hruschev's greatest surprise when he sent nuclear 
weapons and warheads to Cuba in 1962 was the overwhelming suppon in Latin America 
for President Kennedy's insistence that these weapons be withdrawn -- much greater 
suppon than that provided by Emope and Asia.. 
Second, the OAS is an instrument for limiting United States intervention in Latin 
America. The 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic was an interesting case. 
Support for intervention to avoid a Communist coup was, in fact, much stronger than a 
number of Latin American governments indicated in public; but, without question, there 
was widespread Latin American uneasiness in principle, against U.S. unilateral 
intervention in the Dominican Republic. What happened? The OAS organized a 
Hemispheric military force under a tough Brazilian general to take over from the United 
States command; and it organized a carefully inspected democratic election to choose a new 
government. To almost everyone's satisfaction - and, I must add, widespread surprise --
the Dominican Republic has enjoyed reasonably steady economic and social progress under 
democratic government for the past quaner ccnmry. 
I would not for one moment argue that American actions in the Western Hemisphere 
have always commanded universal support in Larin America. Perhaps the saying attributed 
to Porfirio Diaz overdoes it: "Poor Mexico. so far from God, so close to the United 
States." But the colossus of the North has on cx;ca:;ion been an awkward neighbor, as well 
as, from time to time, a good neighbor. Nevertheless, I d1 1 hdieve the OAS would be 
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regarded in Latin America as a useful instrument to balance the historic disproponion 
between the economic and military power of the United States and the nations of Latin 
America, a disproponion diminishing with the passage of rime and the diffusion of power. 
There is a third security task for the OAS; to deal with conflicts between Latin 
American states - specifically, the considerable anxiety arising from rime to time among the 
smaller states with respect to the three largest Larin American states. 
The foreign minister of one of these smaller states once put it very well in a private 
conversation: "The only legitimate function of our military is, in case of invasion, to make 
a dignified show of force on our frontier until the OAS observers anive." In an imperfect 
world that is an impressive tribute to the civilizing role of the OAS. Even more impressive 
is the fact that Latin American state!i spend only about 1 % of GNP on their military 
establishments, by far the lowest regional average in the world. 
I shall not on this occasion examine the potential regional agendas of Africa and 
South Asia. They involve similar but obviously not identical security, economic, and 
social tasks. 
VI 
The Organization of the Pacific Basin 
I turn now to an enterprise much closer to Seoul: the regional organization of the 
Pacific Basin. On November 9, 1989, twelve nations meeting in Canberra set in motion an V 
organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). November 9, 1989, was 
also the day the Berlin Wall came down It is possible that only two people on the face of 
the earth independently expressed in public the view that in the long sweep of history the 
modest birth of APEC may well outrank the end of the Berlin Wall: one of those men was 
my old friend Lee Hahn-Been writing in Korea Business World, the other was myself, in a 
television interview on November 9th. 
I took that view because for some time it was quite clear that Stalin's empire in 
Eastern Europe was doomed; that soon or late the wall would go; and all behind it would 
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change. On the other hand. APEC was a collective, first formal step on one of the most 
imponant tasks of the twenty-first century: to assure that the governments and peoples of 
the Pacific Basin "maintain international peace and security ... practice tolerance and live 
together ... as good neighbors." 
In terms of population, economic and technological momentum, and military 
potential the Pacific Basin is likely to remain the most imponant single community on eanh . 
It contains not only China and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, but is also 
inevitably linked by geography with South Asia. And in the course of the coming century 
that linkage could become increasingly imponant, especially if South Asia's affairs could 
be stabilized in the spirit of the organization of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC), 
created in 1983. 
Put more bluntly, the challenge to the Pacific Basin in the coming century is not to 
repeat the tragedy of the twentieth century. That tragedy can be defined in this way: on 
four occasions, nations which arrived somewhat late to command over all the then existing 
technologies, looked about; observed that those who developed earlier were distracted by 
economic problems, isolationist in spirit, or otherwise weakened and disorganized; and 
decided that regional hegemony was within their grasp. Thus, the Kaiser, the Japanese 
military, Hitler, and Stalin plunged the world into two global conflicts and a cold war kept 
reasonably chill -- but not for Koreans -- mainly because of mutual fear of the 
consequences of using nuclear weapons. All four aggressive efforts failed; but the tragedy 
of these struggles and their aftermath dominated the twentieth century and are only now 
beginning to lift. 
I would underline that the early developers, including the United States, bear some 
responsibility for the outcome. Their behavior before these conflicts helped encourage the 
belief that aggression might succeed. In this world of diffuse and .still diffusing power 
with the capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction proliferating, we must all' strive 





This is a good time, then, to move forward in building and giving substance to 
APEC which will have its third meeting in Seoul in November. It is true that the problem 
of Cambodia has not yet been settled and Vietnam has not yet found the road to civilized 
and efficient modernization which its talented people are clearly capable of traveling. The 
issue of unity is still to be settled peacefully by Koreans; and formal peace established 
between Japan and the Soviet Union. But over-all the scene is relatively tranquil and the 
time propitious to move forward on the many tasks of economic and technological 
cooperation which ought to be on our common agenda. 
I had the privilege of observing the growth of the spirit and habit of European unity 
from the earliest post-1945 days. That sense of unity grew by doing things together day 
after day -- in coal and steel, transpon and electric power, trade and finance. An authentic 
sense of community gradually emerged so strong that the young men and women of 
Western Europe now hardly know when they cross a national frontier. A sense of the 
Pacific Community is nor that far advanced; but we should remember that the idea of the 
Pacific Basin did not begin with the Canberra Communique of 1989. That communique 
was, in fact, one result of innumerable regional conferences and experiments in cooperation 
- by the private as well as the public sector -- over the two previous generations. APEC 
has deeper roots than one might think. 
What about the network of security relations in the Pacific Basin? Do the new 
circumstances require significant change? Certainly there are no grounds for combining the 
present network in some kind of Pacific NATO. The security concerns of the various 
countries of the region vary a good deal; and the present network of arrangements by and 
large meets those concerns. If they do not, that fact will emerge in time. But if I have any 
advice to the governments it would be this: let them be. These arrangements have seen us 
through some four difficult decades to better times. The current arrangements threaten no 
one; and there is no general threat. This is a rime for concentrating our energies on building 
the constructive dimensions of the Pacific Community, not destabilizing its security 
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foundations , just as in Europe it is time for East and West to concentrate on the 
rehabilitation of the Eastern economies, and other consrructive enterprises, not on the 
disintegration of NA TO. 
Let me say a word about my country. A few years ago there was a good deal of talk 
in the United States and around the world about the decline and fall of the United States as 
a great power. Lately there has been a good deal of talk about the United States as the 
single remaining super-power. Both images of the United States are, I believe, misleading. 
My country has had and still has a considerable array of serious domestic problems; but we 
are a big, resilient, creative society, with many centers of initiative and experiment and a 
saving, skeptical sense of humor. We a.re commined by our origins as a nation to ideals 
beyond our reach -- perhaps beyond human reach. But we keep striving. On our most 
serious problem -- the building of a multi-racial society of equal opporrunity - I have been 
able to observe great progress in my lifetime, but obviously we have a great deal more to 
do. I believe the increasingly multi-racial character of American society will be a source of 
American strength in the next century. In short, I believe the United States will prove a 
viable nation in the coming generations. 
As for being a super-power, I have argued for at least the past thiny years that power 
was being systematically diffused away from both Washington and Moscow and that the 
notion of a super-power is an illusion; and progressively becoming more of an illusion. 
The United States does represent a significant margin of power and influence when it does 
the right thing. If the United States seeks to do something which runs against the grain of 
majority thought and feeling in the world, it can be easily frustrated or, indeed, vetoed. 
When its view of things conforms to the common view or majority interest, the United 
States can still play a useful catalytic role in the enterprise, as in the recent Gulf crisis. 
In the Pacific Basin, the United States is simply one of many players. APEC is a 
club where each of us will have to listen carefully to each other, and understand how the 




Korea and the New World Order 
Suppose the picture I have drawn of a strengthened post-Cold War United Nations 
supplemented by sturdy regional organizations is a reasonable approximation of a New 
World Order -- a bringing to reality of pan. at least, of the dream enunciated in the 
preamble to the United Nations Charter. Where does Korea fit into this scheme of things? 
This is a much harder question to answer than to estimate Korea's stage of growth 
26 years ago. Obviously, only Koreans can decide. As one privileged to observe closely 
and to share a little of Korea's evolution over the past thiny years, I offer, therefore , only a 
few tentative observations. 
In the living room of our home in Austin, Texas, is a gift from an official of this 
counrry. It is a splendid model of one of Admiral Yi Sun Sin's turtle ships which 
preserved Korean independence in the Battle of Chinhae Bay in 1592. It symbolizes a 
good deal of Korea's history and achievement: to have stubbornly preserved its 
independence -- cultural, political, and economic - surrounded as it has been by much 
larger and more powerful neighbors. And it is not yet a world where that spiky toughness, 
ingenuity, and determination to be independent can be safely abandoned. 
But if I am broadly correct this is an historical inrerval when large positive objectives 
should be sought, and there is a decent hope that we can make progress towards them. 
For the Republic of Korea, of course, first is the achievement by peaceful means of a 
unified country. There are, evid~ntly serious problems to be solved but they are strictly a 
matter for agreement among Koreans. 
A second task is building on the foundation of APEC, and all that lies behind it, a 
solid, active, constructive, and inclusive Asian and Pacific Community. Here the J 
experience symbolized by Admiral Yi's turtle ships can be turned to constructive account. 
Korea sits almost literally at the point of juncture of three of the great Pacific Powers: 
China, the Soviet Union, and Japan. It has shared almost a half century of hard times and 
/ 
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good rimes with the United States. As with the people of Western Europe, within the 
framework of mutual security arrangements, the Korean people have understandably 
wished to reduce their dependence on the United States. I believe this is one reason the 
Republic of Korea has worked since the 1960s on behalf of Asian regional cooperation. 
The American government has supported both objectives: a Korea reducing its dependence 
on the United States -- or any other nation -- and increasingly engaged in cooperative 
ventures in the Pacific Basin. 
Korea is now and is destined to be a substantial, middle-level power in the Pacific 
Basin and in the world. If all goes well, we may fill end up as middle-level powers; for we 
are entering an era in which we hope the possession of weapons of mass desrrucrion - and 
military power itself -- will become decreasingly important. In any case, the Republic of 
Korea has earned the respect of the world community, even of governments once its 
enemies. 
In the development of the Pacific Basin, Korea is in a unique position to help 
harmonize the interests of the Community's members and has a profound and abiding stake 
in that harmonization. 
I believe China and the Soviet Union will join APEC and, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
as well. There are problems to be settled before this enlargement comes about. But the 
organization can not achieve its full potential until that happens. 
As for substance, it is clear that there are more potentially fruitful areas for economic 
cooperation than APEC can initially undenake. As a development economist I would 
underline one area highly appropii.ate in building a sense of community among nations at 
different stages of development; namely, assistance from the more advanced to the less 
advanced in building up their capacity to absorb efficiently sophisticated modern 
technology. This is particularly imponant in an era where a powerful technological 
revolution is rapidly unfolding; the less advanced nations are anxious not to be left behind; 
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and the more advanced are anxious to contribute creatively to the extension of the world's 
technolo~ical frontier. 
One characteristic of this particular technological revolution is its close links to areas 
of basic science which are themselves undergoing n-volutionary change. To enlarge the 
technological absorptive capacity in the Asia-Pacific community and to increase its capacity V 
to enlarge the world's scientific and technological base, APEC might consider creating and 
financing an Institute of Advanced Scientific Research which would concentrate on ./· 
enlarging the scientific base on which innovations in micro-electronics, genetic 
engineering, lasers, and new industrial materials must rest. Such a frontier institute would 
not only increase the understanding of scientists from the less advanced countries of the 
region, on which absorptive capacity panly depends, but also enlarge the creative 
contribution to the world community of the region as a whole. 
The United States and other advanced industrial nations have benefitted handsomely 
in trade and otherwise from their programs of technical and economic assistance since 
1945, and I was pleased to learn recently in the pages of Korean Business World of the 
impressive scale of the Republic of Korea's current ~rogrma of foreign aid. 
As for the world beyond the Pacific Basin, the Republic of Korea is already an active 
player in the world economy; and its role is expanding rapidly as I was reminded when I 
rolled our luggage out of the Budapest Airpon last summer on a carrrier bearing a large 
SAMSUNG sign. Although it now only has official observer status at the United Nations, 
if I counted correctly, the Republic of Korea is a member of thirty-seven multilateral bodies 
including the International Whaling Commission. Its clearly established global status was 
confirmed and enhanced by its elegant as well as efficent hosting of the 1988 Olympics. 




Of In and Yeh 
When I came to this point in planning my talk I reached a question I couldn't answer. 
what in Korea's cultural and historical tradition fitted the role of a creative, understanding, 
humane middle power, helping pull together in reasonable harmony, a vast and diverse 
community? For that is the way I would describe a role for Korea in the New World Order 
as a whole. 
I put the question to a greatly respected Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Texas, Korean-born Professor Thomas Seung. 
Professor. Seung proceeded to educate me in the concepts of In and Yeh . He 
explained that historically Korea was regarded and regarded itself as the Eastern country of 
propriety, of courtesy, of civilized behavior. And behind this categorization lay a view of 
human beings as dependent on, understanding and caring for one another. He regarded 
this view as an extension of the Confucian view beyond the family to wider communities. 
He thought it was time for Korea to build its policy at home and abroad increasingly on this 
strand in its cultural heritage. 
Professor Seung's lesson recalled a memorable conversation. The time was an 
extremely early breakfast on October, 5 1983. The place was a hotel in Seoul. My wife 
and I were leaving later that morning for Calcutta. My companion at breakfast was the 
economist Kim Jae-Ik, adviser to the President. T h:1rl heard a good deal about him during 
our days in Seoul. He appeared to be universally 11--•pected. I was pleased to accept his 
invitation to breakfast. 
We had much to talk about and got on well. I finally asked him this question: What 
is your greatest concern about the future of Korea? He paused and then replied; 'The 
youth. They naturally take the economic progress achieved in the past generation for 
granted and seek new objectives. But I fear they do not understand that those wider 
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objectives depend on continues economic progress which can not simply be taken for 
granted. It must be carefully nunured even as we widen our horizons.' 
As a teacher since 1940, living and working with the young, I reminded him how 
inevitable it is that each generation strike out in new directions; but I agreed that in a world 
of rapidly changing technologies an economy c3.!1 never rest on its oars without paying a 
high cost in the quality of its life as well as in material affluence. 
It was with a heavy heart that I read a few days later in an Indian newspaper on 
October 10 that Kim Jae-I.k: was assassinated in Rangoon. 
As an old teacher I am too experienced to prescribe objectives for the young, let 
alone the young of another country. But I am sure the young of all countries have an 
instinct to link their lives to some high ideal. And it may be that Professor Seung's effon 
to educate me in In and Yeh as a guide for policy at home and abroad may be of interest 
In the context of this talk, these Confucian injunctions have a special meaning. You 
may recall my observation that the United Nations could, under the right circumstances, 
undo aggression; but it was never meant to have the power to guarantee "fundamental 
human rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] .. the equal rights of men 
and women." The governments meeting in San Francisco in 1945 could reaffirm their faith 
in these precepts; but the task of achieving these goals was left to each national society. 
Since then these goals have not been fully achieved anywhere and in some places 
there has been little or no progress -- or, even, retrogression. But if one looks t0 the 
relative strength of democracy versus dictatorship in the world, as a whole, there has been 
discernible progress in recognizing and acrin~ nn these fundamental human rights --





What, then, is the New World Order as conceived in this paper? 
Built on the preamble to the Chaner of the United Nations, it embraces these five 
elements: 
-- A credible framework of 'uniting for peace' by the United Nations Security 
Council, especially its permanent members, to undo acts of aggression. 
-- Against that background, systematic and organized regional effons. embracing 
where acceptable a role for interested nations outside the regions, to maintain balances of 
power that make regional aggression grossly irrational. 
-- Systematic regional as well as global economic and technological cooperation 
including sustained efforts by the more advanced nations to assist the less advanced in 
moving forward in economic and social progress. 
-.., Stubborn efforts by governments and their citizens to continue the trend towards 
increased democratization and the funher extension of "human rights," including respect 
for "the dignity and worth of the human person." 
- The underpinning of this effon to achieve a civilized and humane world order by 
a heightening within our several societies of those su-ands in our respective cultures and 
religions which enjoin the individual to care for the fate of others as well as our own. 
It is my judgment that the Republic of Korea, by its efforts, example, and cul rural 
inheritance is in a position to make a major contribution to all these dimensions of a New 
World Order in the generations ahead. 
I am aware that one should speak about the future with considerable caution and 
diffidence, rembering John Maynard Keynes' dictum: "The inevitable never happens: it is 
the unexpected always." Nevertheless, when I spoke of Korea's economic future with 
hope in May 1965, I did so with a high degree of confidence. I feel today a similar degree 
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of confidence in the possibility of a New World Order and of Korea's important role within 
it .. 
I conclude with a few lines of poetry to which I have often returned. They come 
from the nineteenth century American poet, Walt Whinnan, after whom I happen to be 
named. Only in preparing th', talk did I learn how close they are to the spirit of In and 
Yeh: 
"One thought ever at the fore --
That in the divine ship, the world, 
Breasting time and space, 
All peoples of the globe together sail, 
Sail the same voyage, 
Are bound to the same destination." 
W.W. Rostow 
Austin, Texas 
April, 1991 
